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Mechanisms of Responsiveness: What MPs Think of Interest Organizations 
and How They Deal with Them 
 
 
Abstract 
 
By employing individual-level data on MPs in 15 countries and 73 national and local 
assemblies this paper examines the conditions under which individual MPs are responsive to 
interest organizations. We show that MPs’ political values influence their responsiveness: 
MPs with more egalitarian and socially open values are more responsive to interest 
organizations. Moreover, MPs’ conceptions of democracy also matter in that more negative 
views of popular political involvement in democratic decision making are linked to lower 
responsiveness to interest organizations. Reliance on established ties with groups in society as 
well as support for technocracy have differential effects for responsiveness towards “old” and 
“new” interest organizations characterized by diverse social bases. These findings have 
important implications for democratic practice since they show how MPs are not all equally 
responsive to organized citizens as well as how different types of factors matter for 
responsiveness to “old” and “new” types of interest organizations.  
 
Keywords: Interest organizations, political elites, political attitudes and values, democratic 
responsiveness 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The data employed in this paper were collected as part of the PARTIREP project. We would 
like to thank the participants in this project and in particular Stefaan Walgrave. We are also 
grateful to Frédéric Varone, four anonymous referees, and the Editors of Political Studies for 
their insightful comments. Earlier versions of this research were presented at the LIVEWHAT 
Project’s International Conference in Geneva, 14–16 October 2015, the ESA Research 
Network Social Movements Midterm Conference, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 19-
20 February 2015, and at the ResponsiveGov MoveOut Workshop at the University of 
Leicester, 16-17 June, 2014. The authors are grateful to all those who provided feedback at 
these presentations. All remaining errors are our own and the usual disclaimers apply.  
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
Mechanisms of Responsiveness: What MPs Think of Interest Organizations 
and How They Deal with Them1 
 
 
Introduction  
Citizens routinely organize collectively to influence political representatives (Giugni and 
Grasso 2018a). Scholarship has investigated the outcomes of such efforts primarily in two 
distinct research traditions: research on interest groups and that on social movement 
outcomes. Research on interest groups has focused mainly on the impact of lobbying 
activities on policy-making in the various stages of the legislative process (e.g. Baumgartner 
et al. 2009; Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Klüver 2013; Mahoney 2008; see Hojnacki et al. 2012 
for a review; Richardson 2013), including how interest groups influence how MPs from 
different parties cast their votes in parliament (Fellowes and Wolf 2004; Giger and Klüver 
2016) and how interest groups perceive their own level of influence on representatives 
(Newmark and Nownes 2017). Works on social movement outcomes have inquired into the 
circumstances under which protest activities lead to policy changes (e.g. Amenta 2006; 
Amenta et al. 1992; Andrews 2001; Burstein 1998a; Gamson 1990; Giugni 2004; Meyer 
2005; see Amenta et al. 2010 for a review). Other works have examined both types of actors 
as well as political parties (Burstein and Linton 2002). Yet, while these strands of literature 
yield important insights into the political effects of organized groups in society, we still know 
little about the individual-level mechanisms of responsiveness and how certain features of 
MPs, such as their values and democratic conceptualizations, impact on their responsiveness 
to interest organizations (Burstein 1999). This has important implications for making sense of 
democratic practice and the avenues to solve the crisis of responsibility and responsiveness 
currently afflicting advanced democracies (della Porta 2015, Giugni and Grasso 2018b).  
While scholars have recently started to examine policy-makers and political 
representatives’ views about protest activities (Gilljam et al. 2012; Marien and Hooghe 2013; 
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Uba 2016; Wouters and Walgrave 2017), research on the individual-level factors conditioning 
how MPs respond to interest organizations is still sparse. We aim to contribute to redressing 
this state of affairs by examining the following research question: What are the individual-
level mechanisms underlying MPs’ responsiveness to interest organizations? To answer this 
question, we focus on various characteristics of MPs and examine the responsiveness of 
politicians to interest organizations from an individual-level perspective. To this end, we 
follow Burstein’s (1999) approach which groups social movement organizations and interest 
groups under the more general category of interest organizations as distinct from political 
parties on the basis that the latter have a special legal status, whereas the former does not. 
This distinction is particularly relevant when studying elites’ responsiveness. Whereas 
political parties are specifically organized to represent citizen interests democratically in 
parliamentary assemblies through the representative link, interest groups and social movement 
organizations do not have immediate access to parliaments and legislative chambers and, as 
such, need to target party representatives in order to have an impact on policy-making (Giugni 
and Grasso 2018c). Therefore, when analyzing the individual-level mechanisms that impact 
on MPs’ responsiveness to interest organizations, we consider these two types of 
organizations as very similar for the purposes of this specific type of investigation. This focus 
on interest organizations allows us to bring together the insights from two bodies of literature 
that have tended to talk past each other, namely the literature on social movements and that on 
interest groups, allowing us to develop on the insights from both fields.  
Beyond the specific focus on how MPs view and deal with interest organizations, our 
study speaks to broader concerns about the impacts of organized citizen participation in the 
public sphere (Giugni and Grasso 2017). This is an important area of investigation given the 
current “democratic deficit” in advanced democracies (Norris 2011). In this respect, the 
literature on social movement outcomes has increasingly shifted focus on the targets of 
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protest. These works look at both state (Luders 2006, 2016; Skrentny 2006) and non-state 
targets (Balsiger 2016; King 2016; King and Pearce 2010). This literature has shown that we 
should not only study who participates in politics and why but also how the targets of interest 
organizations i.e. policymakers perceive them. Studies of democratic responsiveness have 
mainly focused on the conditions under which political elites respond to shifts in public 
opinion and react to citizens’ preferences as captured by opinion polls (Burstein 1998b; Page 
and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), including looking at whose preferences 
are most influential in shaping policy decisions (Gilens 2005), often providing mixed 
evidence (Burstein 2014; Manza and Cook 2002). Following the way paved by Burstein 
(1998a) among others, in this paper we aim to broaden the scope of these forays by inquiring 
into the conditions under which representatives are responsive to interest organizations in 
their everyday work “between elections” (Esaiasson and Narud 2013). Moreover, we do so 
following comparative approach providing added value through generalization of the 
implications of our study beyond specific national contexts. 
 
Mechanisms of responsiveness  
Why are some policy-makers more responsive to interest organizations? We can draw on 
different strands of literature for insights on this question. To start with, the literature on the 
political consequences of the actions of social movement organizations tends to emphasize the 
incentivizing function of disruption and the way in which making claims on representatives 
can disrupt governing institutions to such an extent that powerholders might yield concessions 
to appease those petitioning them for change (Piven and Cloward 1979). In addition to 
disruption, Andrews (2001) stresses two further mechanisms explaining why policy-makers 
might respond to interest organizations such as social movements: persuasion and negotiation. 
On the one hand, interest organizations might succeed in persuading policy-makers about the 
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need for policy change. On the other hand, MPs might be persuaded through a process of 
negotiation. In terms of deliberative theory, while persuasion can be seen as the outcome of a 
deliberation process, negotiation is more akin to bargaining. Moreover, Lohmann (1993) 
noted how taking into account the claims of organized citizens can be seen as a rather an 
instrumental attitude by elected officials aimed at preserving their power. Within a 
representative democratic set-up, interest organizations should not have a direct impact on 
public policy, since representatives should in theory bear the interests of the majority of 
citizens into account in making decisions, and not prioritize the needs and demands of 
particular interests or minority groups (Krehbiel 1991; Lohmann 1993). However, some 
representatives may give more attention to some interest organizations than others as they 
might see this as a useful means to preserve power. While this could be seen to undermine 
democratic principles and the quality of democracy at least under more popular conceptions 
(Mair 2006), it might nonetheless allow politicians to preserve their power and, as such, 
provide an incentive for this type of behavior whereby particular interests and specific interest 
organizations have greater access to the corridors of power than others. For example, 
representatives might perceive that only those citizens that organize themselves in advocacy 
groups with large sources of funding would effectively have the resources and ability to 
punish them if they did not action the requested policy changes and, as such, that the costs of 
not listening to some interest organizations are higher than those of not listening to other, 
more disorganized groups of constituents. 
On the other hand, social movements could be seen to only have an indirect effect on 
policy, and organizational activities that respond to the electoral concerns of elected officials 
are especially likely to have an impact since responding only to minority concerns could risk 
representatives not being re-elected (Burstein and Linton 2002). Burstein (1999) has stressed 
three ways in which interest organizations in general and social movement organizations more 
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specifically can have an indirect impact on public policy and representative’s willingness to 
change public policy through public pressure: by changing the public’s preferences, that is, 
attracting public opinion to their cause; increasing public concern with regard to the issues 
raised by the movement; and changing the legislator’s perception of the public’s preferences 
or of the issue’s saliency in the public space. These mechanisms rely on electoral adaptation 
in the sense interest group organizations may be able to impact on public opinion or 
representatives’ perceptions of public opinion to such an extent that representatives need to 
address the claims of the interest organizations in policy making in order to win re-election.  
Zooming in to how these dynamics might play out at the individual level, in terms of 
those characteristics of MPs that might influence their responsiveness, recent scholarship on 
the impact of the political participation of organized groups of citizens on policy-makers 
provides some clues to develop new theorizing on the individual level. In this respect, a 
number of recent studies stand out for having studied elites’ attitudes towards different types 
of political action, most notably protest activities. Gilljam et al. (2012) examined 
representatives’ attitudes towards controversial noninstitutionalized forms of citizen protest in 
Sweden and found in particular that representatives to the right show lower protest acceptance 
than those to the left and that representatives with more protest experience show higher 
protest acceptance. Also focusing on Sweden, Uba (2016) studied protests against school 
closures in Sweden and found that personal background was key for understanding policy 
makers’ responses. The study by Marien and Hooghe (2013), also with PARTIREP data, 
investigated the perceived effectiveness of different forms of political participation by both 
citizens and representatives. They found that MPs tend to consider taking part in elections as 
the most effective means to influence political life, while they see that boycotting, internet 
discussions, and illegal protests are the least effective. More recently, Wouters and Walgrave 
(2017) have shown that Belgian politicians rely on certain features of protest, such as the 
 9 
 
 
 
 
demonstrators’ worthiness, unity, numerical strength, and commitment, as cues about what 
the public want. At the same time, however, they found no evidence that elected officials’ 
predispositions moderate the effects of the protest features. 
 Inspired by the results of these rare individual-level studies looking at political elite 
responses to social movements and perceptions of effective political activism, we develop 
new theorizing with respect to how responsiveness towards interest organizations at the 
individual level is more likely to be activated depending on certain characteristics of MPs. 
This leads us to advance eight hypotheses on the impact of these individual characteristics. To 
begin with, we expect that MPs with more egalitarian and socially open or more leftist and 
libertarian values will be more inclined to be open towards interest organizations, including 
protest groups, relative to MPs who have more rightist and authoritarian values (H1) and who 
instead prioritize law and order (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). Left-libertarians tend to have 
a preference for “politics from below” as well as supporting the activities of social movement 
organizations (Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b, 2018). We may therefore hypothesize that 
policy-makers with stronger left-libertarian values should be more prone to support interest 
organizations and therefore to be responsive to them as the latter represent such “bottom-up” 
collective efforts that they value on the part of organized citizens to impact on policy-making 
and democratic governance. Left-libertarians also tend to have a more participatory stance 
towards political participation, politics and democracy (Grasso 2016). Specifically, they are 
more sensitive to a participatory and deliberative conception of democracy (della Porta and 
Rucht 2013). As such, we argue that more left-libertarian attitudes will stimulate MPs to be 
more open to all sorts of organized groups of citizens, specifically since this type of attitude 
underscores a belief in popular political involvement in democratic practice of all groups, not 
just specific ones (Mair 2006). We therefore expect that this will apply both in general terms 
and also for the specific interest groups across worker’s, women’s and environmental 
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organizations since research on ideological affinity has shown how representatives are more 
likely to react to issues raised within their political camp (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2014; Spoon et al. 2014). Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016) have 
recently applied this idea to analyze when political parties respond to protests reported on in 
the media showing how partisan characteristics condition the effect of protest on 
parliamentary activity. Moreover, we hypothesize that MPs who more greatly rely on 
established ties with groups in society will be more likely to be responsive based on the self-
interest argument about electoral adaptation and their desire for re-election (H2). 
Additionally, we expect that greater party attachment on the part of MPs and a higher 
tendency to tow the party line will make them less likely to seek external advice for their 
policy initiatives and, as such, to be less responsive to interest organizations (H3).  
Just as with ordinary citizens, politicians have different views about the democratic 
process (Dahl 1989; Schumpeter 1952). This comprises a number of different aspects. One 
such aspect is representatives’ conceptions of democracy and the desirability of public 
engagement in decision making (Mair 2006). Politicians and ordinary citizens alike display 
different degrees of political cynicism with respect to the established institutional channels of 
representation. For example, some think that the state today is unable to solve the most 
pressing problems (Giugni and Grasso 2016). As such, representatives’ cynicism about 
politics, politicians and the democratic process may also impact their responsiveness levels. 
We expect that greater cynicism with respect to the established institutional democratic 
channels will lead to greater responsiveness since MPs will be more likely to want to look for 
solutions outside of the corrupt or “careerist” usual suspects and therefore look to external 
interest organizations for inspiration and suggestions in their policy-making (H4).  
Representatives also differ in their views about citizens’ involvement in politics and 
more specifically about the desirability of their involvement in decision-making. Some are 
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closer to a participatory or even deliberative conception of democracy and believe that 
citizens should be included as much as possible, whereas others believe that too much citizen 
involvement is potentially destabilizing (Mair 2006). As such, we expect more negative views 
of popular political involvement in democratic decision making to be linked to lower levels of 
responsiveness to interest organizations on the part of MPs (H5). Moreover, different views 
may arise as to the extent to which decision-making should be delegated to experts and 
independent agencies. With respect to this aspect we further expect MPs who are more 
supportive of technocracy to be more responsive as they will be more inclined to take on 
external, evidence-based opinions for the development of their policies and their decision-
making that rely less on ideological convictions or patronage of specific groups (H6).  
We expect all these variables to have similar effects across our six dependent variables 
capturing diverse dimensions of responsiveness with the exception of our expectation for 
differential effects with respect to reliance on groups in society, where we theorize that 
responsiveness to “old” workers’ organizations should more closely linked with this factor 
whereas we would expect the two “new” types of organizations (Giugni and Grasso 2015) to 
be less so given the more fluid social bases of new social movements (H7). Moreover, we also 
expect that responsiveness to “old” workers’ organization should not be positively associated 
with support for technocracy relative to responsiveness to environmental organizations or 
women’s groups as “new” types of organizations, which tend to place greater emphasis on the 
relevance of evidence-based expert and scientific knowledge for supporting political 
campaigns (H8). These latter two hypotheses for differential effects across different types of 
issue-specific measures of responsiveness allows us to test whether different types of 
characteristics and attitudes apply equally across different types of interest organizations with 
different types of beneficiaries or not. In this way, our analysis allows us to assess whether the 
factors affecting MP responsiveness vary across the distinction between “old” (labor) 
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organizations and “new” (women’s, environmental) organizations and, within the latter 
category, between “subcultural” (women’s) and “instrumental” (environmental) organizations 
(Kriesi et al. 1995). As such, we are able to grasp in part whether MPs pay specific attention 
to certain issues, an aspect that is at the core of the agenda-setting approach to the study of 
social movement outcomes (Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). 
 
Data and methods 
To test our hypotheses, we analyze survey data from the PARTIREP project. The PARTIREP 
team has coordinated a survey among members of parliament in 15 countries and in 73 
statewide and substate parliaments. The survey, conducted between March 2009 and 
December 2010, covers a wide range of countries with different cultural contexts and political 
systems. 2 In this study we examine data from all 15 countries included in the project: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. It should be noted that the sample size vary across 
countries, ranging from a low 34 in Ireland to a high 749 in Switzerland.3 Since we deal with 
hierarchically embedded data (individual respondents in countries), we run multi-level 
regression analysis and, more specifically, random-intercept models with country as level-2. 
Between-country variation is thus taken into account in the random effects. The multi-level 
modelling also allows us to adjust the analysis to the fact that we deal with unbalanced 
samples. All the models are set at the same number of cases (N = 1729) in order to be able to 
compare across models.  
The PARTIREP survey includes a number of questions which allow us to 
operationalize our measures of interest. Given that responsiveness is a complex concept, we 
operationalize it through six different but related dependent variables. First, we examine MPs’ 
responsiveness to interest organizations in terms of their subjective assessments of the 
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desirability of involving interest groups in decision-making more often. The survey question 
asked: “To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following are desirable?” To involve 
interest groups in society more often in decision-making, where the variable is coded 1 for 
“not at all desirable” and 4 for “very desirable”. Second, we examine responsiveness in more 
objective terms, with respect to the regularity of self-reported contact with interest 
organizations. The survey question asked: “In your role as a Member of Parliament, how 
often in the last year have you had contact with the following groups, persons, or 
organizations?” workers’ organizations and trade unions; women’s organizations; 
environmental organizations; youth organizations; elderly organizations; and ethnic 
minorities’ organizations. The variable is coded 1 for “almost never” and 5 for “almost every 
week.” We created a mean scale of contact with these six interest organizations (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.78), where higher values signal greater frequency of contact.4 Third, we examined 
responsiveness in terms of the self-estimated percentage of initiatives derived from interest or 
action groups, in other words a more specifically behavioral reflection of responsiveness. The 
survey question asked: “Of the initiatives (e.g. bills, written and oral questions) which you 
personally raised in Parliament in the last year, roughly what proportions of these did you 
respectively derive from the media, from interest groups, from within the party, from meeting 
with individual citizens, and from your personal experience? Could you please give a rough 
estimate in percentages?” Interest and action groups. The response was a numeric answer 
indicating the self-assessed percentage. 
Additionally, we wanted to analyze three measures of responsiveness with a more 
issue-specific character, allowing us to assess whether the characteristics and values of MPs 
discussed in our theoretical framework impacted differently on responsiveness towards three 
different types of interest organizations or whether their effect was uniform, allowing us to 
generalize our explanations for MP responsiveness to interest groups to a whole variety of 
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groups. Here we examined the regularity of contact with three specific organizations. The 
survey question asked: “In your role as a Member of Parliament, how often in the last year 
have you had contact with the following groups, persons, or organizations?” We created three 
separate variables for each of workers’ organizations and trade unions, women’s 
organizations, and environmental organizations. Each variable was coded 1 for “almost 
never” to 5 for “almost every week.” Appendix 1 shows the mean values of the six dependent 
variables across countries. 
With respect to the independent variables, first we operationalize the political attitudes 
of MPs in terms of their left-libertarian values. To do so we use the following survey 
question: “People hold different views on political issues. What do you think of the 
following?” Larger income differences are needed as incentives for individual effort; 
government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy; people who break 
the law should be given stiffer sentences; immigrants should be required to adapt to the 
customs of our country; government should make sure that films and magazines uphold moral 
standards. The variable is coded 1 for “right-authoritarian” to 5 for “left-libertarian.” All the 
items were reverse coded so that higher values mean a more left-libertarian ideological 
position and we created a scale combining them (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75). 
Second, we operationalized MPs’ self-interest and political reliance on established ties 
with groups in society through their responses to a survey question asking: “To retain their 
seat in Parliament, Members of Parliament often face hard choices. How would you choose to 
allocate your limited resources? Would you choose to spend more effort and money on 
achieving the goal on the left-hand side, would you choose to spend more effort and money 
on the goal on the right-hand side, or would the allocation of resources to both goals be about 
equal?” The variable is coded 1 for “to seek out groups in society that haven’t supported you 
in the past” to 5 for “to retain the support from the groups in society that have supported you 
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in the past.” We reverse coded this variable for ease of interpretations so that positive effect 
would mean greater reliance on groups in society for their political support.  
Third, we operationalized the extent of MPs party attachment and sense of party 
discipline through their self-assessment of the extent to which their opinion differed from that 
of the party through the survey question asking “How often, in the last year, would you say 
you have found yourself in the position that your party had one opinion on a vote in 
Parliament, and you personally had a different opinion?” The variable is coded 1 for “about 
once a month” to 4 for “(almost) never.” 
Fourth, we assess the impact of the extent of MPs’ cynicism towards the established 
institutional channels of the democratic process through a question asking: “It is often stated 
that voters have lost trust in politics and politicians. Listed below are a few statements that are 
very commonly heard in this regard. Regarding each of these commonly heard statements, 
could you indicate whether you personally agree or disagree?” The state no longer possesses 
the capacity to solve society’s most pressing need; political parties are not offering really 
different options to the people; parties make too many promises on which they cannot deliver; 
most politicians are out of touch with people’s concerns; politicians let their own position on 
political issues be determined by the campaign advisers and the polls; politicians are more 
concerned with the clash of persons than with the confrontation of ideas; special interests 
have too much influence on public policies. Where the variable was coded 1 for “strongly 
disagree” to 5 for “strongly agree.” We combined all seven items into a scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.73). 
Fifth, we captured the effect of the extent of MPs negative views of citizens’ 
involvement in decision-making through a survey asking: “In recent years, different views on 
voters’ distrust of politicians and political parties have inspired widely diverging suggestions 
for reform. Of each of the following directions that reform could take, could you indicate how 
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desirable you consider them?” To create more opportunities for citizens to set the political 
agenda; to increase the number of deliberative events, where groups of ordinary citizens 
debate and decide on a particular issue opportune. The variables is coded 1 for “very 
desirable” to 4 for “not at all desirable.” We reverse coded the items so higher values meant 
more negative views of citizens’ involvement and combined them into a scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.54).5 
Sixth, we assess the impact of MPs support for greater technocratic influence in 
policy-making through a question asking: “In recent years, different views on voters’ distrust 
of politicians and political parties have inspired widely diverging suggestions for reform. Of 
each of the following directions that reform could take, could you indicate how desirable you 
consider them?” To delegate more decision-making to experts and independent agencies. The 
variable is coded 1 for “not at all desirable” to 4 “very desirable.” 
Finally, we include two controls variables. First, party ideology is a categorical 
variable including 12 ideological orientations controlling for a variables controlling for the 
party position of MPs. This is an important aspect to be taken into account, as we may expect 
MP that are ideologically close to certain interest organizations to be more responsive to 
them. Moreover, having contacts with certain interest organizations might be a party strategy. 
Second, we also include a dummy variable coded 0 if MPs are members of a party in 
opposition and 1 if they are members of a party in government. Appendix 2 provides 
summary statistics for all the variables included in the analysis. 
 
The Effect of MPs’ characteristics on Their Responsiveness to Interest Organizations 
We test for the effect of the various characteristics of MPs on their responsiveness to interest 
organizations by means of multi-level regression analysis taking into account between-
country variation with the random effects. We present the findings concerning the potential 
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effects of political attitudes and values in two separate tables. The first shows responsiveness 
to interest organizations in general, while the second refers to issue-specific responsiveness 
across “old” (labor and trade union) and “new” (women’s and environmental) interest 
organizations. The two hypotheses referring to differences across types of organizations are 
discussed when we address the specific factors at hand. 
Table 1 shows the results for the three general indicators of responsiveness. 
Confirming H1, MPs who display left-libertarian values tend to have more regular contacts 
with different types of organizations. Left-libertarian values, however, are not associated with 
MPs stating that it is desirable that interest groups in society become involved more often in 
decision-making, nor with them estimating that a higher share of the initiatives they raised in 
the parliament are derived from interest and action groups. This may suggest that the 
interpretation of these items specifically addressing interest and action groups rather than 
interest organizations more generally could signal the protection of group interests over more 
majoritarian, grassroots-type coalitions which the egalitarianism of left-libertarians prefer 
according to the literature, leading them to shy away from affirmative responses in this 
respect.  
Table 1 
The findings from Table 2 for the three issue-specific indicators of responsiveness 
largely reflect those pertaining to the more general indicator of regularity of contacts with 
interest organizations, attesting to the fact that there is strong consistency of the effect of left-
libertarian values on responsiveness across different types of organizations, both “old” and 
“new.” 
Table 2 
Moving on to testing H2, on the three general measures of responsiveness, we observe 
a negative effect of reliance on groups in society on contact regularity with interest 
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organizations. In contrast to our hypothesized relationship, MPs who are more reliant are in 
fact found to be less responsive to interest organizations in terms of contact regularity. Given 
the fact there is no significant effect on the other general indicators, this would seem to 
suggest that closer ties with specific groups in society would make them MPs less responsive 
with respect to other interest groups and therefore lead them to spend on average less time in 
contact with interest organizations. This finding shows that MPs who already have solid 
social bases in society are less likely to be open to other interest organizations. Our second 
hypothesis is therefore not confirmed. 
Moving on to testing H3, we find no effect of party attachment on responsiveness on 
any of the general or issue-specific measures. This suggests that this MP characteristic does 
not influence the extent to which they are responsive to any kind of interest organization. 
Thus, contrary to our third hypothesis, having a different view than the own party does not 
seem to lead to a higher degree of responsiveness by MPs. 
Testing for H4 also does not yield significant effects of MP cynicism with regards to 
the established institutional channels of the democratic process with the exception of a 
negative effect on responsiveness to women’s organizations. To this extent we do not find 
evidence that MPs become more responsive to external organizations as a result of their 
disillusionment with established democratic channels.  
Moving on to testing for H5, we find that with MPs with more positive view of 
citizens’ involvement are more likely to say that it is desirable to involve interest groups in 
decision making as well as reporting higher contact regularity on the general measure and also 
with the two “new” types of organizations (women and environmental). This confirms our 
fifth hypothesis and shows that MP responsiveness is closely linked to how positively they 
view citizen involvement in politics and, as such, that responsiveness to interest organizations 
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in general is linked to a deeper belief in popular conceptions of democracy and the positive 
influence of organized citizen engagement in the democratic running of the state.  
Testing for the impact of favorable attitudes towards greater technocratic involvement 
in government, we find a positive effect on two of the three general measures of 
responsiveness. Specifically, we observe a strong effect on the subjective measure of 
involvement desirability and a weaker but still significant effect on regularity of contacts with 
interest groups. Furthermore, there is also a significant effect on one of the more specific 
measures of responsiveness, namely regularity of contacts with women’s organizations.  This 
partly supports H6. 
Further examining the results for the issue-specific indicators, we had hypothesized a 
differential effect for different types of organizations in H7 in that here we would find that 
MPs’ responsiveness to workers’ organizations would be more closely linked to their reliance 
on groups in society relative to responsiveness to “new” environmental and women’s 
organizations with more fluid social bases. We find some confirmatory evidence in that MPs 
who are less reliant on groups in society are more likely to be responsive to environmental 
organizations. As such, we find evidence of some differential effects of MP attributes for their 
responsiveness to different types of “old” and “new” organizations, supporting H7. 
Finally, our findings also provide evidence supporting H8 concerning the impact of 
support for technocracy on “old” and “new” organizations. If we look at the three specific 
measures of responsiveness, we observe a significant effect of this variable on regularity of 
contact with women’s organizations, providing partial confirmation for H8 this hypothesis. 
 Table 3 summarizes the eight hypotheses and the results. It is important to note that 
the effects we found above for our variables of interest are net of the effect of the party 
position of MPs as well as of their being members of a party in government rather that in 
opposition. Thus, those MPs who are more left-libertarian, who have more positive views of 
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popular citizen political involvement, or who are more supportive of greater technocratic 
involvement are also more likely to be responsive to interest organizations, depending on the 
specific indicator we focus upon. 
Table 3 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Knowing which conditions lead MPs to be responsive is of crucial importance for 
understanding the relationship between citizens and their representatives in democratic 
societies. While there is a wealth of studies about how representatives respond to elections, 
our knowledge about other forms of democratic responsiveness is more limited (Esaiasson 
and Narud 2013). Interest organizations have an important role to play for democratic practice 
and our study has shown that there are important individual-level mechanisms linking the 
responsiveness of MPs to interest organizations. We found evidence that some MP 
characteristics have a differential impact on responsiveness to different organizations, for 
example with respect to support for greater involvement of experts in decision-making and in 
the result that MPs with lower levels of reliance on established ties with groups in society 
were more likely to be responsive to environmental organizations. Most importantly, we 
found evidence across types of organizations that MPs with stronger egalitarian and socially 
liberal political attitudes were more likely to be responsive to interest group organizations. 
This reflects existing accounts in the literature which have stressed that the left is closer to the 
social movements (della Porta and Diani 2006). Some have framed that in terms of the “civil 
rights coalition” being closer to the claims and interests of civil society actors – of which 
social movements are part – than the “law-and-order coalition” (della Porta 1999), therefore 
facilitating the political impact of social movements. This result also confirms Gilljam et al.’s 
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(2012) findings that representatives to the right show lower protest acceptance than those to 
the left.  
We also found a strong and consistent effect of MPs’ support for popular citizen 
involvement in the political process on their responsiveness across indicators. These effects 
were consistent across both different types of general as well as issue-specific indicators of 
responsiveness indicating that more leftist and socially liberal MPs that have a popular 
conception of democratic engagement, seeing the involvement of organized groups of citizens 
in decision-making as a beneficial and desirable thing are most likely to be responsive. These 
findings, in turn, suggest that these aspects are critical if we are to resolve the crisis of 
responsibility and responsiveness currently afflicting advanced democracies (della Porta 
2015). They show that if constituents and organized groups of citizens want to be heard by 
their representatives they should consider electing and targeting more leftist and socially 
tolerant representatives who have been shown by this analysis to be  more likely to listen to 
the demands of organized groups of citizens. This is also true of those representatives who 
feel that the involvement of citizens in policy-making is something which is intrinsically 
valuable and necessary for healthy democratic government. 
Our findings also have a number of important implications for the study of the impact 
of organized collective efforts to influence policy-making and more generally for the role of 
citizens in the democratic process. We contribute to the study of the conditions under which 
interest organizations may gain access to the institutionalized political arenas. In this way, our 
study provides insights on the role of citizens in the democratic process. Whereas popular 
democrats think that citizen involvement is not only beneficial but crucial for vibrant 
democracies, elitist democrats see popular involvement at best as purely useful for 
legitimating elite decision making and at worse potentially destabilizing (Mair 2006). Our 
analysis suggests that MPs who are more likely to subscribe to the popular view are more 
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likely to be responsive and, as such, that cultivating this ethos within political parties and 
parliaments will be critical in the future to resolve the crisis of responsiveness and 
responsibility currently afflicting advanced democracies, and particularly so since the wake of 
the Great Recession (della Porta 2015). This is consistent with the notion of associative 
democracy as supplementing both representative democracy and market economy (Hirst 
1993). As such, knowing the conditions under which policy-makers become more open 
towards and reliant upon organized groups of the civil society, as well as the mechanisms 
leading to such openness and reliance, could provide an incentive towards a stronger role of 
the latter in the public affairs. 
While our study made several important innovations as highlighted above, it also has 
limitations which can be addressed further in future studies. We focused on MPs in different 
countries as well as their political attitudes and values, but future research should also look at 
other targets. This approach holds the promise for further unveiling the underlying 
mechanisms through which interest organizations may bring about policy change by 
providing more detailed answers to the question of why policy-makers or other targets 
respond positively to their claims and activities. Future works could also study more 
thoroughly and analyze systematically the impact of the attitudes and perceptions of elite 
actors on the activation of mechanisms of responsiveness. They could additionally take into 
account the impact of the context on the way in which MPs think of interest organizations and 
deal with them. Our analysis has focused on the individual-level characteristics, but future 
research could examine how the activation of individual-level mechanisms of responsiveness 
may vary also depending on differential contextual characteristics cross-nationally. 
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Table 1: Effects of selected variables on three general indicators of responsiveness 
 
 Desirability of 
involving interest 
groups in decision-
making 
Regularity of contacts 
with interest 
organizations in 
general 
Percent of initiatives 
derived from interest 
and action groups 
Left-libertarian political values -.02 (.03) .10*** (.03) .62 (.71) 
Reliance on existing ties to groups in 
society 
.03 (.02) -.04** (.02) .12 (.44) 
Party attachment  .02 (.02) .01 (.02) .30 (.49) 
Cynicism with respect to established 
institutional democratic process 
-.04 (.03) -.05 (.02) -.89 (.71) 
Negative views of popular citizen 
political involvement  
-.34*** (.03) -.10*** (.03) -.74 (.74) 
Support for greater technocratic 
involvement  
.19*** (.04) .04* (.02) .83 (.65) 
Party ideology (ref.: Green)       
  Communist -.07 (.18) .29 (.15) 3.25 (4.37) 
  Socialist or socio-democratic .06 (.08) -.03 (.07) -3.11 (1.92) 
  Christian-democratic -.03 (.09) -.19* (.08) -4.38 (2.29) 
  Conservative -.05 (.09) -.14 (.08) -5.28* (2.31) 
  Liberal -.03 (.09) -.21** (.08) -.61 (2.33) 
  Far right -.36** (.13) -.50*** (.12) -8.18* (3.24) 
  Regionalist .17 (.12) -.30** (.11) -3.67 (3.00) 
  Agrarian -.13 (.35) -.48 (.31) -4.17 (8.56) 
  Single issue .07 (.37) -.09 (.33) -12.33 (9.30) 
  Religious .10 (.18) -.37* (.15) -5.53 (4.37) 
  Other -.03 (.21) -.19 (.18) -12.71** (4.89) 
Party in government -.02 (.04) .06 (.04) .49 (1.05) 
Constant 3.10*** .21 3.10*** (.19) 22.97*** (5.09) 
Number of groups 15  15  15  
Number of observations 1729  1729  1729  
Sigma u .24  .26  3.36  
Rho .10  .14  .03  
Log likelihood -1906.66  -1686.21  -7457.42  
Notes: Random-intercept models with country as level 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2: Effects of selected variables on three issue-specific indicators of responsiveness 
 
 Regularity of contacts 
with workers’ 
organizations 
Regularity of contacts 
with women’s 
organizations 
Regularity of contacts 
with environmental 
organizations 
Left-libertarian political values .18*** (.04) .11** (.04) .16*** (.04) 
Reliance on existing ties to groups in 
society 
-.04 (.02) -.03 (.03) -.06* (.03) 
Party attachment  .01 (.03) .00 (.03) -.00 (.03) 
Cynicism with respect to established 
institutional democratic process 
-.03 (.04) -.12** (.04) .01 (.04) 
Negative views of popular citizen 
political involvement  
-.06 (.04) -.14*** (.04) -.12** (.04) 
Support for greater technocratic 
involvement  
-.01 (.04) .13*** (.04) .04 (.04) 
Party ideology (ref.: Green)       
  Communist .93*** (.24) .22 (.25) -.46 (.25) 
  Socialist or socio-democratic .52*** (.11) -.24* (.11) -.86*** (.11) 
  Christian-democratic .02 (.13) -.43*** (.13) -.98*** (.13) 
  Conservative .09 (.13) -.37** (.13) -.96*** (.13) 
  Liberal -.12 (.13) -.48*** (.13) -.91*** (.13) 
  Far right -.44* (.18) -.94*** (.18) -1.42*** (.19) 
  Regionalist .20 (.17) -.73*** (.17) -.98*** (.17) 
  Agrarian .26 (.48) -.80 (.49) -1.07* (.49) 
  Single issue -.30 (.51) -.27 (.53) .43 (.53) 
  Religious -.29 (.24) -.76** (.25) -.84*** (.25) 
  Other .08 (.28) -.16 (.29) 1.06*** (.28) 
Party in government -.11 (.06) .23*** (.06) .03 (.06) 
Constant 2.88*** (.29) 3.06*** (.30) 3.58*** (.29) 
Number of groups 15  15  15  
Number of observations 1729  1729  1729  
Sigma u .28  .36  .24  
Rho .08  .11  .05  
Log likelihood -2456.89  -2493.61  -2514.53  
Notes: Random-intercept models with country as level 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Summary of hypotheses and results 
 
H1 MPs with more egalitarian and socially open or more leftist and libertarian values will be 
more responsive  towards interest organizations  
Confirmed 
H2 MPs who more greatly rely on established ties with groups in society will be more 
responsive  towards interest organizations 
Rejected 
H3 MPs with stronger party attachment will be less responsive to interest organizations Rejected 
H4 MPs expressing greater cynicism towards the established institutional processes will be 
more responsive  towards interest organizations  
Rejected 
H5 MPs with more negative views of popular political involvement in democratic decision 
making will be less responsive to interest organizations  
Confirmed 
H6 MPs who are more supportive of technocracy will be more responsive to interest 
organizations  
Partly 
confirmed 
 
H7 Responsiveness to “new” types of organizations will be less closely linked to reliance on 
groups in society relative to responsiveness to “old” types  
Partly 
confirmed 
H8 Responsiveness to “new” types of organizations will more closely linked to support for 
technocratic involvement relative to responsiveness to “old” types 
Partly 
confirmed 
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Appendix 1: Mean values of the six dependent variables across countries 
 
 Desirability of involving Regularity of contacts with Percent of initiatives 
 interest groups in interest organizations derived from interest 
 decision-making in general and action groups 
  
 
 Regularity of contacts with Regularity of contacts with Regularity of contacts with 
 workers’ organizations women’s organizations environmental organizations 
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Appendix 2: Variable descriptives 
 
 N Mean S. D. Min. Max. 
Involvement desirability 1729 2.64 .80 1 4 
Contact regularity with SMOs 1729 2.83 .76 1 5 
Percent of initiatives derived from 
SMOs 
1729 21.13 18.37 0 100 
Workers’ organizations 1729 3.11 1.17 1 5 
Women’s organizations 1729 2.61 1.14 1 5 
Environmental organizations 1729 2.79 1.12 1 5 
Left-libertarian political values 1729 3.06 .85 1 5 
Reliance on existing ties to groups in 
society  
1729 3.21 1.01 1 5 
Party attachment 1729 2.84 .95 1 4 
Cynicism with respect to established 
institutional democratic process  
1729 2.72 .68 1 5 
Negative views of popular citizen 
political involvement 
1729 2.12 .67 1 4 
Support for greater technocratic 
involvement 
1729 1.69 .72 1 4 
Party ideology 1729 4.25 1.99 1 12 
Party in government 1729 .57 .49 0 1 
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Notes 
                                                             
1
 The data used in this publication were collected by the PARTIREP MP Survey research team. The PARTIREP 
project was funded by the Belgian Federal Science Policy (BELSPO – grant n° P6/37). Neither the contributors 
to the data collection nor the sponsors of the project bear any responsibility for the analyses conducted or the 
interpretation of the results published here. We would like to thank Frédéric Varone for his comments and 
suggestions on a previous draft. 
2
 The data can be obtained through the project’s website at http://www.partirep.eu, after signing a data 
distribution contract. Information about the case selection, process of data collection, response rates and 
representativeness of the data can be found in Deschouwer et al. (2014). 
3
 The number of respondents in each country is the following : 169 in Belgium, 62 in France, 279 in Germany, 
99 in Hungary, 34 in Ireland, 39 in Israel, 101 in Italy, 65 in the Netherlands, 46 in Norway, 121 in Portugal, 749 
in Switzerland, and 86 in the United Kingdom. 
4
 The measure of regular contacts is close to what in the literature on social movement outcomes is often referred 
to in terms of access, acceptance, or procedural impact (Amenta et al. 1992; Burstein et al. 1995; Gamson 1990; 
Kitschelt 1986).  
 This also applies to the three more specific measures of responsiveness. 
5
 The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is lower than the ideal cut-off, but since it is a two item scale and we did 
not have other items available we felt this was the best indicator that we could offer from the dataset. 
